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Abstract
This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjust-
ment for population games. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework
of utility maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved,
since it satises the desirable properties: Nash stationarity, positive correlation, and
existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solutions. We also show that, similarly to
other well-behaved dynamics, a general result for elimination of strictly dominated
strategies cannot be established. Instead we rule out survival of strictly dominated
strategies in certain classes of games. We relate it to the projection dynamic, by
showing that the two dynamics coincide in a subset of the strategy space. We
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1show that strict equilibria, and evolutionarily stable strategies in 2  2 games are
asymptotically stable under the target projection dynamic. Finally, we show that
the stability results that hold under the projection dynamic for stable games, hold
under the target projection dynamic too, for interior Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
The traditional concept in the theory of strategic form games is the Nash equilibrium,
which by denition embodies the notions of correct beliefs and rationality. However this
approach does not say much about how players reach the point of actually implementing
the equilibrium strategy. This question led to the development of a whole branch of game
theory, which on the contrary to the traditional rational models is based on individual
behavior that dynamically changes according to set of myopic rules. The usual questions
that are addressed in this kind of evolutionary models focus on the behavioral properties
of the adjustment rules, and on the limiting behavior of a population of agents who behave
according to these myopic rules.
The main dynamic processes in the theory of strategic form games are the replicator
dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991),
and the Brown-Nash-von Neumann (BNN) dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950).
Sandholm (2005) introduced a denition for well-behaved evolutionary dynamics through
a number of desiderata: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solutions (EUC), Nash
stationarity (NS), and positive correlation (PC). He showed that unlike the replicator and
the best-response dynamics, the whole family of BNN dynamics { which are known as
excess payo { are well behaved.
In the present paper we analyze the target projection dynamic that was introduced
in a game-theoretic framework in the same paper by Sandholm (2005), and which {
as we prove { satises the previous properties. Initially we go beyond the geometric
structure that made this model intuitively appealing, and we present the microeconomic
foundations that motivate its use. More specically we show that it is based on a model
of rational behavior under the constraint of control costs (Mattsson and Weibull, 2002).
We also show that on certain subsets of the strategy space it coincides with the projection
2dynamic (Sandholm et al., 2006).
Following the analysis of Berger and Hofbauer (2006), and Hofbauer and Sandholm
(2006) we show that there are games where strictly dominated strategies survive under the
target projection dynamic. Though the original analysis was built upon the construction
of pathological examples, it still prevents us from establishing a general result. We instead
show that strictly dominated strategies are always eliminated in certain classes of games.
Namely in the existence of two pure strategies the dominated one never survives. The
same result holds if the gap between the dominated and another strategy is at least 2.
The second, and probably more challenging task is to investigate the limiting properties
of the target projection. A large number of papers have been written about dierent
dynamics and dierent classes of games, but most of them seem to agree that an ideal
dynamic would be one that converges to a point or a set that satisfy some traditional
game theoretic equilibrium concept, for a large subset of initial values. Of course no
global result has been established till now (Hart and Mas Collel, 2002).
In the present paper we present a number of partial stability results for some equi-
librium renements, and dierent classes of games under the target projection dynamic.
We show that every strict equilibrium is asymptotically stable. A similar result has been
proven for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) under the replicator dynamic in single
population random matching two-player games (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). In the target
projection dynamic, we show that ESS in 2  2 games are asymptotically stable.
Finally we show that the stability results proven by Sandholm et al. (2006) for stable
games under the projection dynamic hold for completely mixed equilibria under the target
projection dynamic too. This is quite interesting since large classes of games, such as zero-
sum, and games with interior ESS, belong to the family of stable games.
The present paper is structured as follows: Section 2 includes the notation and the
basic framework of population games. Section 3 presents the target projection dynamic,
its fundamental properties, and some general results about domination, strict equilibria,
and ESS. Section 4 investigates the population behavior in equilibrium renements, and
special classes of games. Section 5 concludes.
32 Preliminaries
2.1 Population games
We follow the traditional framework of population games; see Sandholm (2005, 2006).
Let N = f1;:::;ng, with n  1, denote the set of populations. Agents in an arbitrary
population i 2 N form a mass mi > 0. For simplicity we take mi = 1 for every i 2 N.
Let Ai = fa1
i;:::;a
Ji
i g be set of the available actions (pure strategies) to agents that
belong to the i-th population, with ai 2 Ai denoting the typical element. Every agent
selects an action, so that the distribution of actions over a population i 2 N belongs






i = 1g. A vector  2 (A) = n
i=1(Ai) is called
(population) state, and describes the behavior across the superpopulation N. A payo
function U : (A) ! RJ, with J =
Pn
i=1 Ji, is a Lipschitz continuous mapping, that
assigns a unique real number to every available action ai 2 Ai of every population i 2 N,
when  2 (A) is played. The payo assigned to action a
j
i is denoted by U
j
i () and
we denote by Ui() = (U1
i ();:::;U
Ji
i ()) the vector of payos to the dierent actions
available to population i.
The framework of population games allows for considerable 
exibility, including the
play of a single population symmetric game, as is usual in evolutionary game theory
(Weibull, 1995; Maynard Smith, 1982), or the play of nite strategic games (Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998).
Denition 2.1. A state  is a Nash equilibrium of the population game if each strategy
that is used in  is a best response to :
For all i 2 N;j 2 f1;:::;Jig; if 
j
i > 0; then U
j
i ()  U
k
i () for all k 2 f1;:::;Jig:







This subsection contains some results on projections. In particular, Proposition 2.1 es-
tablishes a link between maximizing a linear function and certain projection problems.
4Proposition 2.2 gives a simple expression for projection onto the unit simplex.
For vectors x;y 2 Rn, let x0y :=
Pn
i=1 xiyi denote the usual inner product, and for
z 2 R, let [z]+ := maxfz;0g. An arbitrary norm on Rn is denoted by jj, and the standard






Proposition 2.1. Let j  j be a norm on Rn. Let C  Rn be nonempty, convex, a 2
Rn;c 2 C.
(i) The following two claims are equivalent:
(a) c solves maxx2C a0x
(b) c solves maxx2C a0x   jx   cj2.
(ii) If the norm jj is generated by an inner product h;i, let vectors b1;:::;bn constitute
an orthonormal basis of Rn (i.e., hbi;bji equals one if i = j and zero otherwise).
Dene v : Rn ! R by taking, v(a) := 1
2
Pn
i=1(a0bi)bi, for each a 2 Rn. The problem




0x   jx   cj
2 = argmin
x2C
jx   c   v(a)j
2: (2)
Proof. (i) [(a) ) (b)] Assume (a) holds. Since jc   cj = 0, it follows, for each x 2 C,
that
a




0x   jx   cj
2;
so (b) holds.
[(b) ) (a)] Assume (b) holds. Let x 2 C and  2 (0;1). By convexity, x+(1 )c 2 C.
Since jc   cj = 0, it follows that
a
0c  a
0(x + (1   )c)   j(x + (1   )c)   cj
2
= (a




Rearrange terms and divide by  > 0 to obtain that a0c  a0x jx cj2. Since  2 (0;1)
is arbitrary, let  approach zero to establish (a).
(ii) Maximizing the function x 7! a0x   jx   cj2 is equivalent with minimizing x 7!
jx   cj2   a0x. It therefore suces to show that the latter function is identical to the
5function x 7! jx c v(a)j2, up to an additive constant. Using the linearity and symmetry
properties of the inner product, we nd
jx   c   v(a)j
2 = hx   c   v(a);x   c   v(a)i
= hx   c;x   ci   2hx;v(a)i + 2hc;v(a)i + hv(a);v(a)i
= jx   cj
2   2hx;v(a)i + 2hc;v(a)i + hv(a);v(a)i:
The nal two terms are independent of x, so it remains to show that the two linear
functions x 7! a0x and x 7! 2hx;v(a)i are identical. We do so by establishing that they

















for each basis vector bi, nishing the proof.
Remark 2.1. The usual inner product on Rn induces the Euclidean norm k  k. If we
apply Proposition 2.1 to the norm jj induced by the rescaled inner product hx;yi := 1
2x0y,




2en, where ei 2 Rn is the i-th standard





















so v is the identity function. /
The following proposition characterizes projection on a unit simplex.
Proposition 2.2. Consider n 2 N, and let n = fx 2 Rn
+ :
Pn
i=1 xi = 1g be the (n   1)-
dimensional unit simplex. Let P : Rn ! n denote the projection on n w.r.t. the
standard Euclidean distance.
(i) P is Lipschitz continuous.
For every x 2 Rn, there is a unique (x) 2 R such that
(ii)
Pn
i=1[xi + (x)]+ = 1, and
(iii) P(x) = ([x1 + (x)]+;:::;[xn + (x)]+).
6Proof. (i) Recall from the Projection Theorem (see, for instance, Luenberger, 1969, p.
69) that for every z 2 Rn, P(z) is characterized by
 
z   P(z) j w   P(z)

 0 for all
w 2 n. In particular, for all x;y 2 Rn:
 













P(y)   y j P(y)   P(x)

, add the two inequalities,
and use Cauchy-Schwarz to establish
0 
 
x   P(x) + P(y)   y j P(y)   P(x)

= kP(y)   P(x)k
2  
 
y   x j P(y)   P(x)

 kP(y)   P(x)k
2   ky   xk kP(y)   P(x)k:
Conclude that kP(y)   P(x)k  ky   xk, i.e., P is Lipschitz continuous with expansion
factor 1.
(ii) Let x 2 Rn. The function T : R ! R dened for each  2 R by T() =
Pn
i=1[xi+]+
is the composition of continuous functions and therefore continuous itself. Let m =
maxfx1;:::;xng. Then T() = 0 for all  2 ( 1; m] and T is strictly increasing on
[ m;1), with T() ! 1 as  ! 1. By the intermediate value theorem, there is a
unique (x) 2 [ m;1) such that T((x)) = 1.




i=1(yi   xi)2. This is
a convex quadratic optimization problem with linear constraints, so the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are necessary and sucient to characterize the minimum location: y 2
n solves the problem if and only if there exist Lagrange multipliers i  0 associated
with the inequality constraints yi  0 and  2 R associated with the equality constraint
Pn
i=1 yi = 1 such that for each i = 1;:::;n:
y

i   xi   i +  = 0; (3)
iy

i = 0: (4)
















7with respect to yi and condition (4) is the complementary slackness condition. It is now
easy to see that y := ([x1 + (x)]+;:::;[xn + (x)]+) solves the minimization problem:
set i = 0 if [xi + (x)]+ > 0, i =  xi   (x)  0 if [xi + (x)]+  0, and  =
 (x). Substitution in (3) and (4) shows that these necessary and sucient conditions
are satised.
Remark 2.2. Proposition 2.2(iii) immediately implies that for all x 2 Rn and i;j 2
f1;:::;ng: if xi   xj  1, then Pj(x) = 0. /
3 The target projection dynamic
The target projection dynamic, the dynamic process governing the adjustment of popu-
lation states that we study in this paper, was mentioned brie
y in the concluding section
of Sandholm (2005, pp. 166-167). It was originally dened for the somewhat dierent
framework of congestion networks by Friesz et al. (1994). The formal denition is as
follows:
Denition 3.1. Let (N;(Ai)i2N;U) be a population game. The target projection
dynamic (TPD) is dened, for each i 2 N, by the dierential equation
_ i = P(Ai)[i + Ui()]   i: (5)
Here, P(Ai) denotes projection on (Ai) w.r.t. the usual Euclidean distance.
The basic idea is simple and standard for most dynamic processes in game theory.
The payos associated with the dierent actions determine the direction in which their
weights are changed by reinforcing the better actions and decreasing the weight of worse
ones. Of course, simply running in the direction of the payo vector Ui() might take
you outside the strategy simplex, but Proposition 2.2(ii) assures that projection onto the
strategy simplex does not aect the order of the coordinates.
The next proposition indicates that the target projection dynamic is essentially a
best-response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), albeit under two bounded rationality
assumptions. The rst is a myopia assumption: by (1), the search for Nash equilibria






which overlooks the fact that a change by population i from i to i does not keep the
payo vector Ui() unaected: it changes to Ui(i; i). The second bounded rationality
assumption involves the introduction of a certain status-quo bias. We follow the control
cost approach, which since its introduction by Eric van Damme (1991) in the study of
equilibrium renements has proved to be a versatile way of providing microeconomic
foundations for a variety of models of strategic behavior (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002;
Mattsson and Weibull, 2002; Voorneveld, 2006). It does so by showing that such behavior
is rational for decision makers who have to make some eort (incur costs) to implement
their strategic choices. One intuitive way of modeling status-quo bias by population i
could be as follows. Suppose that deviation from the current i is costly/requires eort in
the sense that by switching to a strategy i, population i incurs a cost of 1
2jji ijj2, i.e.,
staying at the current mixed strategy is costless, whereas large deviations, i.e., strategies
further away from the current one in terms of Euclidean distance, incur larger costs.










Let Bi() 2 (Ai) denote population i's (unique due to strict concavity of the goal
function) best response against , i.e., the unique solution to this problem. Subject to
these two bounded rationality assumptions, we can now formulate the target projection
dynamic as a best response dynamic:
Proposition 3.1. Let (N;(Ai)i2N;U) be a population game. The target projection dy-
namic is the best response dynamic for the control cost problem in (7), i.e., for each
i 2 N:
_ i = P(Ai)[i + Ui( i)]   i = Bi()   i: (8)
Proof. By denition,
P(Ai)[i + Ui()] = arg min
i2(Ai)
ki   i   Ui()k
2; (9)
9so we need to establish that
arg min
i2(Ai)
ki   i   Ui()k









Using the multilinearity properties of the inner product, the goal function on the left can
be rewritten as
ki   i   Ui()k
2 = hi   i   Ui();i   i   Ui()i
= hi   i;i   ii   2hi;Ui()i
+ 2hi;Ui()i + hUi();Ui()i
= ki   ik
2   2hi;Ui()i
+ 2hi;Ui()i + kUi()k
2:
As the nal two terms in the sum are independent of i, division by  2 gives that






The previous proposition indicates that the target projection dynamic can be inter-
preted in terms of boundedly rational populations striving for best responses. It does not,
however, imply that the dynamic is susceptible to the extensive literature on (perturbed)
best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Fuden-
berg and Levine, 1998). Our status-quo bias models control costs arising due to deviations
from the current state. The usual approaches use control cost functions which:
 are independent of the current state: they dene costs in terms of deviations from
a xed strategy, often uniform randomization (close your eyes and pick an action)
as in Mattsson and Weibull (2002), and Voorneveld (2006),
 are usually required to be steep near the boundary of the strategy space, as in
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002).
3.1 General properties
Theorem 3.1 states that the target projection dynamic satises a number of desirable
properties of \nice" evolutionary dynamics. Indeed, Sandholm (2005) calls a dynamic
well-behaved if it satises the rst three properties of Theorem 3.1.
10Theorem 3.1. Let (N;(Ai)i2N;U) be a population game. The target projection dynamic
satises the following properties:
Nash stationarity: The stationary points of the target projection dynamic and the
game's Nash equilibria coincide.
Basic solvability: For every initial state, a solution to the target projection dynamic
exists, is unique, Lipschitz continuous in the initial state, and remains inside (A)
at all times.
Positive correlation: Within each population, growth rates are positively correlated
with payos: for each i 2 N, if _ i 6= 0, then h _ i;Ui()i > 0.
Innovation: If some population has not yet reached a stationary state, but it has an
unused best response, then a positive mass of individuals switch to it. Formally,
for each  2 (A) and i 2 N, if _ i 6= 0, but there is an action a
j
i 2 Ai with
U
j
i () = maxk2f1;:::;Jig Uk
i () and 
j
i = 0, then _ 
j
i > 0.
Proof. Nash stationarity: Let  2 (A). By (1), Proposition 2.1, Proposition 3.1,
and (5), the following chain of equivalences holds:
 is a Nash equilibrium , 8i 2 N : i 2 arg max
i2(Ai)
hi;Ui()i







, 8i 2 N : i = P(Ai)[i + Ui()]
, 8i 2 N : _ i = 0:
Basic solvability: The target projection dynamic (5) is Lipschitz continuous: let
i 2 N. By assumption, the payo Ui is Lipschitz continuous, say with expansion factor
C > 0. By Proposition 2.2, the projection is Lipschitz continuous with expansion factor
1. Using the triangle inequality, it follows for each ; 2 (A) that
kP[i + Ui()]   i   P[i + Ui()] + ik  kP[i + Ui()]   P[i + Ui()]k + ki   ik
 ki + Ui()   i   Ui()k + ki   ik
 kUi()   Ui()k + 2ki   ik
 (C + 2)ki   ik;





i = 0. Moreover, if 
j
i = 0, then _ 
j
i  0. This makes (A) forward-
invariant. Together, these properties imply (Hirsch and Smale, 1974, Ch. 8) that for
every initial state, a solution exists, is unique, Lipschitz continuous in the initial state,
and remains in (A) at all times.
Positive correlation: Let  2 (A) and i 2 N. Suppose _ i = P(Ai)[i + Ui()]  
i 6= 0. Let i = P(Ai)[i + Ui()] 6= i. Then, using Proposition 3.1, one obtains:











So h _ i;Ui()i = hi   i;Ui()i > 0.
Innovation: Assume that the premises of the innovation property hold, but that _ 
j
i  0.
We derive a contradiction. By Proposition 2.2 there is a  2 R such that








i () + ]+):
By assumption, action j is unused (
j
i = 0) and _ 
j
i  0, so










i () + ]+  0;
i.e., _ 
j
i = 0 and U
j
i ()+  0. But action j is a best response: U
j
i () = maxk2f1;:::;Jig Uk
i ().























i = 0, this implies that _ k
i = 0 for all k 2 f1;:::;Jig, in contradiction with
the assumption that _ i 6= 0.
3.2 Strict domination: mind the gap
Berger and Hofbauer (2006) show that under the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dy-
namic, introduced in Brown and von Neumann (1950), there are games where a strictly
dominated strategy survives. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2006) generalize this example:
12for each evolutionary dynamic satisfying the properties in Theorem 3.1 | actually, they
restrict attention to single-population games | it is possible to construct a game with a
strictly dominated strategy that survives along solutions of most initial states.
As their result applies to our target projection dynamic, it is of interest to investigate
whether there are additional conditions under which such \bad" actions are wiped out.
The next result shows that this is the case if one action strictly dominates another and
the \gap" between them is suciently large.
Proposition 3.2. Let (N;(Ai)i2N;U) be a population game and let i 2 N. Suppose there
are actions k;` 2 f1;:::;Jig such that Uk
i  U`
i  2, i.e., action k strictly dominates action
`, and the gap between the payos is at least two. Then the probability `
i converges to
zero in the target projection dynamic.
Proof. We show that the dierential equation for the probability `
i of action ` is given
by _ `
i =  `
i, because then `
i(t) = `
i(0)e t ! 0 as t ! 1. Let  2 (A). By (5), it
suces to show that the `-th coordinate of the projection P(Ai)[i + Ui()] is zero. By





i ()+]+. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove,
that [`
i + U`
























since the dierence between probabilities is bounded in absolute value by one. However,
since [`
i +U`
i()+]+ > 0, the left-hand side of (10) is smaller than one, a contradiction.
Also if a population has only two actions to choose from, and one of them is strictly
dominated, then it is eventually eliminated:
Proposition 3.3. If a player's action set is Ai = fa1
i;a2
ig, and a1
i strictly dominates a2
i,
the probability assigned to a2
i converges to zero in the target projection dynamic.
13Proof. Let  2 (A). By Proposition 2.2, there is a () 2 R such that the target


















i () + ()  0:









i () + () = 1:





i  1 + U
1
i ()   U
2
i () > 1;
a contradiction, since the left-hand side is at most one.
By continuity of the payos on the compact set (A) and strict domination, there is
an " > 0 such that U1
i ()   U2
i () > " for each  2 (A).
Distinguish two cases. First, if [2
i + U2




i decreases at an exponential rate. Second, if [2
i + U2
i () + ()]+ > 0,
combine this with the facts that [1
i +U1
i ()+()]+ > 0 and that these two numbers add
up to one, to deduce that () =  1
2(U1
i ()+U2




i ()) <  1
2",
i.e., the probability 2
i decreases at a rate bounded away from zero. Hence, along any
solution trajectory, the probability 2
i of the dominated action converges to zero.
3.3 The projection dynamic and the target projection dynamic
The projection dynamic was rst developed by Nagurney and Zang (1997) as part of the
transportation literature, and was later introduced to game theory by Sandholm (2006),
and Sandholm et al. (2006). The underlying dynamic system is dened as follows
_ i = PT(Ai)[Ui()]; (12)




i = 0g, where T(Ai) denotes the tangent cone of (Ai).
As the following results states the projection dynamic and the target projection dynamic
coincide at certain subsets of (Ai).
14Proposition 3.4. Let  2 int((A)) be a Nash equilibrium of a population game. Then
there is a neighborhood O of , such that the projection dynamic and the target projection
dynamic coincide for every  2 O.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.1 that _ i = 0. Since  2 int((A)), it follows that

j

































for every i 2 N, every j 2 Ji, and every  2 O. The previous formula is the projection
dynamic for all interior population states, and therefore for every state in O (Sandholm
et al., 2006), which proves the proposition.
4 The target projection dynamic in strategic games
Much of the literature on strategic adjustment deals with (mixed extensions of) nite
strategic games. In the setting of population games (N;(Ai)i2N;U), this simply means
that each population is associated with a dierent player role and payos are dened
on the set of pure strategy proles A = i2NAi and then extended to mixed strate-








4.1.1 Strict Nash equilibrium
Recall that in nite strategic games a Nash equilibrium is called strict if each player
chooses the unique best reply. Formally:
15Denition 4.1. A state  is a strict Nash equilibrium if every strategy used in  is
the unique best response to :
For all i 2 N;j 2 f1;:::;Jig; if 
j
i > 0; then U
j
i () > U
k
i () for all k 2 f1;:::;Jig:
Consequently, strict Nash equilibria are always Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Proposition 4.1. In a nite strategic game, each strict Nash equilibrium is asymptotically
stable under the target projection dynamic.
Proof. Let  be a strict Nash equilibrium. W.l.o.g., each i 2 N plays his rst action:
i = e1. By denition, for each i 2 N and j 2 f2;:::;Jig: U1
i () > U
j







i ()) = 1+U1
i () U
j
i () > 1. By continuity, there is a neighborhood









i ())  1:
For all  2 O and i 2 N, Remark 2.2 implies that P(Ai)(i + Ui()) = e1 = i; so
_ i = i i. Hence, the function L : O ! R with L() :=
P
i2N ki ik2 is a Lyapunov
function: It is nonnegative, zero only in , and if  2 O n fg:
_ L = 2
X
i2N
hi   i; _ ii = 2
X
i2N





4.1.2 Evolutionarily stable strategies
In symmetric 2-player games strict Nash equilibria are a subset of the evolutionarily stable
strategies, which are dened as population states robust under behavioral mutations.
That is, if a small group of players from a dierent population (in terms of their strategy)
invade the original one, their post-entry payo will be strictly lower than the one entailed
by the incumbent strategy. Thus the mutants will have incentive to switch to the original
strategy.
Formally, consider a symmetric 2-player strategic form game with payo matrix ,
and let Ui() =  denote the payo vector of the corresponding (single) population
random matching game.
16Denition 4.2. A strategy  2 (A) is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if,
for each  2 (A), with  6= , either 0 > 0 or 0 = 0 and 0 > 0.
Equivalently (Hofbauer et al., 1979, p. 610),  is an ESS if there is a neighborhood O of
 such that 0 > 0 for all  2 O n fg.
ESS is a renement of Nash equilibrium, in the sense that the set of strategies that
satisfy evolutionary stability is a subset of the Nash equilibria. That is all ESS are
rest points of every dynamic that satises Nash stationarity. However the converse is
not always true. Since the denition of evolutionary stability is conceptually based on
the idea that the mutants eventually assimilate to the original population, one would
expect ESS to attract the trajectories that get suciently close to them under dynamic
processes of myopic adjustment. Taylor and Jonker (1978), and Hofbauer et al. (1979)
show that every ESS is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamic. The following
proposition extends this result to 2  2 games under the target projection dynamic.
Proposition 4.2. Every ESS is asymptotically stable in 2  2 games under the target
projection dynamic.
Proof. Let  2 (A) be an ESS. If  2 int((A)), apply Corollary 4.1. If not, assume,
w.l.o.g., that  = e1. If e0
1 > e0
2, it follows (from the same argument as in Proposi-
tion 4.1), that P( +) = e1 for all  close to  and, hence, that L() := k  k2 is a
Lyapunov function. Consider then the case where u(a1;a1) = u(a2;a1). We apply _ i = 0,
which holds in equilibrium, for i = 1 and we obtain [1 + U1() + ]+ = 1 > 0. Given
continuity of the projection, there is  > 0 such that [1 + U1() + ]+ > 0, for every 
close to .
Consider now the function
L() = 1   1 = 1   1;
which satises all the Lyapunov requirements: it is continuously dierentiable, positive
denite, and is equal to zero if and only if  = . Then,
_ L =   _ 1 =  [U1() + ]: (13)
17If [2 +U2()+]+  0, it follows that  = 1 1  U1(). Substituting into (13) entails
_ L = 1   1 < 0: (14)





Substituting into (13) entails
_ L =  
1
2
[U1()   U2()] =  
1
2














since u(a1;a1) = u(a2;a1) (by assumption), and (a1;a2) > u(a2;a2) (due to  being ESS).
Combining (14) and (15) completes the proof.
In the next section we extend this result to larger strategic games.
4.2 Special classes of games
Sandholm et al. (2006) prove a number of stability results for potential and stable games
under the projection dynamic. Stable games (Sandholm, 2003) are a family of population
games that include zero-sum games, and games with an interior ESS, and are dened by
hi   i;Ui()   Ui()i  0; (16)
for every ; 2 (Ai), and every i 2 N. The game is called null (strictly) stable if
equality (strict inequality) holds for every ; 2 (Ai), and every i 2 N.
Proposition 4.3. Let  2 int((A)) be a Nash equilibrium in a population game.
(i) If the game is stable then  is Lyapunov stable under the TPD.
(ii) If the game is strictly stable then  is asymptotically stable under the TPD.
(iii) If the game null stable then the TPD denes a constant motion around .
Proof. It follows from Proposition 3.4 that there is a neighborhood O of  where the
projection dynamic agrees with the target projection dynamic. Then there is some  > 0
such that
O := f 2 (A) : k   k
2  g  O:
18Consider now the function
L() := k   k
2:
Sandholm et al. (2006) have shown that L is (i) a Lyapunov function, (ii) a strict Lypunov
function, and (iii) denes a constant motion around  under the projection dynamic.
Since O  O, then every trajectory that starts in O, will remain in it forever, under the
projection dynamic, and therefore under the target projection dynamic, which completes
the proof.
The following two results are a straightforward application of the previous proposition.
Corollary 4.1. A completely mixed ESS is asymptotically stable in the target projection
dynamic.
In the previous section we showed that ESS in 22 strategic games are asymptotically
stable under the target projection dynamic. The previous corollary extends this result to
a larger games.
The following result proves that every trajectory which gets suciently close to a
completely mixed equilibrium in zero-sum games forms a closed cyclical orbit around it.
That is neither it converges to the equilibrium point, nor is it driven away from it. Instead
the trajectory maintains a constant distance from it. Typical examples where this kind
of behavior is exhibited are the matching pennies and the rock-paper-scissors games.
Corollary 4.2. The target projection dynamic forms a cyclical motion around every com-
pletely mixed Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum games.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjustment
for population games. This dynamic originally drew attention due to its geometrically
appealing formulation. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework of utility
maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved, since it satis-
es the desirable properties introduced by Sandholm (2005): Nash stationarity, positive
correlation, and existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solutions. We also show that,
19similarly to other well-behaved dynamics, a general result for elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies cannot be established. Instead we rule out survival of strictly dominated
strategies in certain classes of games. We relate it to the projection dynamic (Sandholm
et al., 2006), by showing that the two dynamics coincide in a subset of the strategy space.
In the second part of the paper, we study the target projection dynamic as a rule
of myopic adjustment in the framework of nite strategic games. We show that strict
equilibria, and ESS in 2  2 games are asymptotically stable under the target projection
dynamic. Finally, we show that the stability results that hold under the projection dy-
namic for stable games, hold under the target projection dynamic too, for interior Nash
equilibria.
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